The Court of Appeal has reserved its ruling in the constitutional challenge brought by Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed and his father, businessman Nazar Mohamed, against provisions of Guyana’s extradition law, following oral arguments on Tuesday.
The hearing proceeded in Azruddin Mohamed’s absence, as he remains in custody over the shooting incident near the home of Head of the Special Branch, Prem Narine. His father, Nazar Mohamed, attended the proceedings, along with his sister.
Roysdale Forde appeared for the Mohameds, alongside attorney Damien DaSilva, while Attorney General Anil Nandlall appeared in person to defend the legislation. Siand Dhurjon was also present.
The matter was heard by Chancellor of the Judiciary (ag) Roxane George, Justice of Appeal Rishi Persaud and Justice of Appeal Nareshwar Harnanan.
At the close of the hearing, Chancellor George indicated that the ruling could take some time, reminding the parties that the Court of Appeal has up to one month to deliver its judgment.
The appeal centres on whether Guyana’s extradition framework adequately protects the two men from being surrendered to a third country without the consent of the relevant minister, and whether the legislation gives the executive excessive discretion in deciding whether to extradite a person.
The United States is seeking the Mohameds’ extradition to face criminal charges.
On Tuesday, Forde argued that the law must clearly distinguish between two separate protections: the principle of specialty, which limits the offences for which an extradited person may be prosecuted, and protection against re-extradition, which concerns whether that person can subsequently be sent to another country.
Forde submitted that the two principles serve different purposes and cannot automatically be treated as interchangeable.
He argued that the applicable treaty between Guyana and the United States does not expressly provide the protection against onward extradition contemplated under Section 83B of the Fugitive Offenders Act.
Forde maintained that the treaty provisions and Guyana’s legislation must be interpreted according to their specific wording and requirements, rather than assuming that protection against re-extradition is implied by the principle of specialty.
He also challenged the interpretation adopted in an earlier ruling, arguing that it did not adequately account for the distinctions within Guyana’s statutory framework.
During the hearing, Chancellor George questioned the defence about the constitutional basis of its challenge, observing that the submissions had not clearly demonstrated how the challenged provisions violated the Constitution.
Forde, in response, said he was relying on Articles 40, 122A, 139 and 144 of the Constitution to establish the alleged violations.
The defence also questioned the breadth of the discretion given to the minister under the legislation, contending that the law does not establish sufficiently clear criteria to guide decisions on extradition.
Forde argued that the availability of judicial review does not, by itself, resolve the constitutional concerns raised by the appeal.
Attorney General Anil Nandlall, in response, argued that the extradition arrangements between Guyana and the United States, together with specific assurances obtained from American authorities, adequately address the concern that the Mohameds could be sent to another country without the required ministerial consent.
Nandlall told the court that Guyana had specifically requested assurances from the United States on the issue and that the American authorities had provided a written assurance in relation to the two men.
According to his submissions, the United States assured Guyana that the Mohameds would not be re-extradited to a third country for an offence committed before their extradition without the consent of Guyana’s minister.
Nandlall argued that the assurance was not a separate arrangement outside the extradition process, but formed part of the existing framework governing extradition between the two countries.
He pointed to the bilateral treaty, which he said was inherited from an earlier treaty arrangement between the United Kingdom and the United States, and argued that its provisions had to be considered alongside the assurance obtained in this case.
Addressing the distinction raised by Forde, Nandlall maintained that the treaty’s specialty provisions and the written assurance had to be considered within the broader legal arrangements between the two countries.
He also pointed to Section 41 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, arguing that the relevant arrangements must be considered within the legal framework governing extradition and that the court should take the US assurance into account when assessing whether the statutory requirements had been met.
Nandlall further argued that completion of the judicial stage does not automatically require the minister to surrender a person sought for extradition.
Under his interpretation, the minister must still consider whether surrender would be in the interests of justice. That discretion, he said, remains subject to legal limits and judicial review, including consideration of relevant factors such as the risk of onward extradition.
The Attorney General also challenged the constitutional basis of the appeal, arguing that the defence had not clearly demonstrated how the challenged provisions violated specific constitutional protections.
The appeal raises questions about the relationship between Guyana’s extradition legislation, its treaty arrangements with the United States and the constitutional limits on executive power.
At the centre of the dispute is Section 83B of the Fugitive Offenders Act and whether the existing treaty provisions and assurances provide the protection against re-extradition contemplated by the law.
Source: NEW ROOMS SITE
